Topic: distributed system security

topics > computer science > Group: security

distributed systems

communication protocols
digital signature
implementing distributed systems and applications
key distribution
operating system security
reliability of distributed systems
security by secure domains
security leaks and weaknesses
security of remotely executed code

Subtopic: security protocol up

Quote: A says S means that principal A supports the statement S; A speaks for B (A=>B) means that if A makes a statement, so does B [»wobbE2_1994]
Quote: only a channel can directly make a statement, C says S; e.g., K says S if K signs a certificate containing S [»wobbE2_1994]

Subtopic: distributed system security up

Quote: access control lists do not work well for distributed systems; need authentication, delegation, extensibility, and customized policies [»blazM_1999]
Quote: in a distributed system can not separate authentication from authorization; huge sets of people and requests, often from strangers [»blazM_1999]
Quote: is the key that signed this request authorized to take this action? [»blazM_1999]
Quote: does this set of credentials prove that a request complies with the local security policy?

Subtopic: self-organized vs. authority up

Quote: use fully self-organized, pairwise key management for mobile ad hoc networks (MANET); authority-based approaches do not work well, e.g., problems with certificate renewal and revocation [»vandJ4_2007]

Subtopic: shared system security up

Quote: shared systems serving simultaneous functions with differing security properties; makes computers meeting places [»kampPH7_2004]
Quote: types of shared systems -- control-free, Unix processes, Unix access control, full virtual machine models, execution environments, and trusted operating systems [»kampPH7_2004]

Subtopic: physical security up

Quote: physically separate untrusted computing resources and the security processors [»rushJ7_1983]
Quote: Arpanet needed secure, trusted gateways in locked rooms [»giffDK7_1985, OK]
Quote: security in Andrew depends on physically secure servers, trusted superusers, and trusted software; no user software allowed [»satyM8_1989]

Subtopic: remote boot protocol up

Quote: with a remote boot protocol can have high confidence in the integrity of a system despite a hostile environment and network [»lomaM1_1995]

Subtopic: anonymous domains, e.g., a workgroup up

Quote: avoid using a single entry in a protection domain to stand for a group of users; limited accountability [»satyM8_1989]

Subtopic: owned domains up

Quote: an Andrew protection domain is a user or a group of users with an owner; owner prefixed to group name [»satyM8_1989]

Subtopic: security levels up

Quote: a connection in Andrew has 4 security levels; HeadersOnly prevents new requests but not release and modify; AuthOnly for secure channels [»satyM8_1989]

Subtopic: resource denial up

Quote: Andrew does not guarantee resource denial; e.g., flooding network with packets has no clear solution

Related Topics up

Group: distributed systems   (14 topics, 348 quotes)

Topic: authentication (93 items)
Topic: communication protocols (62 items)
Topic: digital signature (25 items)
Topic: implementing distributed systems and applications (41 items)
Topic: key distribution (35 items)
Topic: operating system security (18 items)
Topic: reliability of distributed systems (35 items)
Topic: security by secure domains (45 items)
Topic: security leaks and weaknesses (67 items)
Topic: security of remotely executed code (24 items)
Topic: trust
(21 items)

Updated barberCB 6/05
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