QuoteRef: searJR_1992

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references sa-sz
limitations of artificial intelligence and cognitive science
metaphysics and epistemology
thought is computational
self-regulating systems
problem of other minds
Turing test
meaning by social context
limitations of formalism
history of science
empirical truth
science as experiment
abstraction as part of language
philosophy of science
objects as a set of attributes
spatial vs. temporal representation
philosophy of mind
sense perception
abstraction by resemblance
what is truth
computer as state machine
identifying the user interface with the system
computer as an intelligent agent
mental models, consistency, and interface metaphors
natural language as a system


Searle, J.R., The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 1992. Google

xiii ;;Quote: consciousness and intentionality are intrinsic and ineliminable, while computation is observer relative; contrary to the dominate position
1 ;;Quote: biological naturalism about mental phenomena-- caused by neurophysiological processes as part of our biological natural history
9 ;;Quote: the defenders of strong AI and functionalism believe that the materialist tradition and science affirms their position
14 ;;Quote: consciousness is an emergent property of the brain just like solidarity or liquidity of water; both mental and physical
16 ;;Quote: we believe that reality is objective but this clearly does not apply to our own subjective states
18 ;;Quote: to study the mind, you must study consciousness; they are the same notion
20 ;;Quote: the ontology of the mental is a first-person ontology, i.e., subjective
21 ;;Quote: we know animals are conscious because of behavior and a causal understanding of how the world works; solves the problem of other minds
21+;;Quote: if same-behavior-ergo-same-mental-phenomena than radios would be conscious; the Turing test is similarly mistaken
32 ;;Quote: we think organization is the answer to intelligence from unintelligent components; but intelligence has third-person criteria that makes the question incoherent
35 ;;Quote: can not identify mental states with brain states without leaving out the mental; both are rigid designators
35+;;Quote: everything is what is and not another thing
40 ;;Quote: for shared beliefs, what is the property shared by different neurophysiological squiggles?; problem with token identity theories
60 ;;Quote: cocktail parties are real but they do not undergo a smooth reduction to physics
90 ;;Quote: consciousness is a biological feature of human and certain animal brains; it is caused by neurobiological processes
105 ;;Quote: consciousness is a feature of the brain like liquidity is a feature of water; it is not "stuff"
107 ;;Quote: conscious organisms have a selectional advantage because of their better discrimination powers
107+;;Quote: conscious organisms represent the world and with intentional actions use their representations to change the world
113 ;;Quote: ontological reduction shows that objects of a certain type are nothing but objects of other types; target for science
114 ;;Quote: causal reduction shows that the existence and causal powers of objects of a certain type are due to the causal powers of objects of another type
114+;;Quote: in the history of science, causal reductions lead to ontological reductions; e.g., reduction of heat to molecular motion redefines heat
116 ;;Quote: consciousness has a causal reduction but not an ontological reduction because it is inherently subjective and first-person
119 ;;Quote: when turn causal into ontological reduction, redefine notions to exclude subjective appearances; e.g., heat from feeling hot to molecular motions
119+;;Quote: the subjective experience of heat still exists after heat is redefined as molecular motion
120 ;;Quote: it is rational to redefine notions like heat to their causes; better control of reality, and fits nature at its causal joints
120+;;Quote: concepts should fit nature at its causal joints
120+;;Quote: Berkely refused to accept the redefinition of subjective concepts to objective ones
122 ;;Quote: consciousness can not be reduced to neurophysiology because its reality is subjective appearances
126 ;;Quote: all furniture is the same shape when wrapped up in enough paper
127 ;;Quote: consciousness is temporally extended but it is not experienced as spatial
130 ;;Quote: consciousness is mostly intentional and intentional states are at least potentially conscious
130+;;Quote: the consciously known features of an object are precisely the conditions of satisfaction for my conscious experiences of them
133 ;;Quote: perception is organized into objects and features, not undifferentiated shapes; consciousness is of something as such and such
135 ;;Quote: familiarity is the source of much of the organization and order of conscious experience; even for an elephant in your room
137 ;;Quote: conscious states "overflow" beyond their immediate content; e.g., can discuss a scene indefinitely
137 ;;Quote: we are consciousness of many things without them being the center of attention; they are not unconscious, e.g., hammering by a skilled carpenter
140 ;;Quote: our current mood pervades all of our conscious forms of intentionality even though it is not itself intentional
152 ;;Quote: an unconscious mental state is always accessible to consciousness; e.g., the belief that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris
179 ;;Quote: each sentence is interpreted against a Background of human capacities; e.g., a waiter won't spread your steak over your head
187 ;;Quote: memory is a mechanism for generating current performance based on past experience, not an inventory of mental states
200 ;;Quote: the operations of the brain can be digitally simulated just like the behavior of the stock market; due to Church's thesis
209 ;;Quote: computation and syntax are observer-relative; 0/1 depends on an interpretation
209+;;Quote: being a chair or a nice day for a picnic is an observer-relative feature
209+;;Quote: mass, gravitational attraction and molecule are intrinsic features of the world; the realm of natural science
209+;;Quote: cognitive science can never be a natural science since computation is observer-relative
212 ;;Quote: most computational theories of mind assume a homunculus; even if reduce to 0/1's still need a homunculus to interpret them
216 ;;Quote: a mechanical computer does not literally follow rules; it only behaves as if it does
218 ;;Quote: word processors are good simulations of a typewriter, but they tell nothing about how typewriters work
229 ;;Quote: the postulation of inaccessible mental phenomena is pre-Darwinian anthropomorphizing; e.g., mental models and universal grammars
241 ;;Quote: cognitive science and universal grammars treat the existence of patterns as evidence for mental representations and unconscious rules; unfounded

Related Topics up

ThesaHelp: references sa-sz (237 items)
Topic: consciousness (57 items)
Topic: limitations of artificial intelligence and cognitive science (64 items)
Topic: metaphysics and epistemology (65 items)
Topic: thought is computational (55 items)
Topic: self-regulating systems (23 items)
Topic: problem of other minds (11 items)
Topic: Turing test (13 items)
Topic: meaning by social context (33 items)
Topic: limitations of formalism (92 items)
Topic: reductionism (51 items)
Topic: history of science (40 items)
Topic: empirical truth (44 items)
Topic: science as experiment (38 items)
Topic: abstraction as part of language (18 items)
Group: philosophy of science   (10 topics, 377 quotes)
Topic: objects as a set of attributes (39 items)
Topic: spatial vs. temporal representation (21 items)
Topic: philosophy of mind (74 items)
Topic: sense perception (52 items)
Topic: recognition (50 items)
Topic: abstraction by resemblance (13 items)
Topic: phenomenology (37 items)
Topic: memory (12 items)
Topic: what is truth (66 items)
Topic: computer as state machine (20 items)
Topic: identifying the user interface with the system (16 items)
Topic: physics (48 items)
Topic: computer as an intelligent agent (49 items)
Topic: rules (43 items)
Topic: mental models, consistency, and interface metaphors (49 items)
Topic: natural language as a system (43 items)

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