690 ;;Quote: any treatment of the concept of truth must circumvent the liar's paradox, e.g., the Cretan prophet

691 ;;Quote: many ordinary assertions about truth are liable to the liar's paradox if empirical facts are extremely unfavorable

693 ;;Quote: let 'Jack' be a name of the sentence 'Jack is short'; could use to prove Godel's incompleteness theorem

693 ;;Quote: a sentence is grounded if one can determine its truth from sentences not mentioning truth; liar's paradox is not grounded

694 ;;Quote: Tarski's hierarchy of languages is the orthodox approach to the liar's paradox; but it requires many versions of 'true'

700 ;;Quote: handle a partially defined predicate by specifying its extension (true for these) and anti-extension (false for these); e.g., three-valued logic

705 ;;Quote: grounded sentences define a fixed point, a language that contains its own truth predicate; liar paradoxes are ungrounded

714 ;;Quote: truth defined by grounded sentences still places "grounded" and "paradoxical" in a metalanguage, but these are specialized concepts