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QuoteRef: shapJS1_2002

topics > all references > ThesaHelp: references sa-sz



ThesaHelp:
references sa-sz
Topic:
open systems
Topic:
operating system kernel
Topic:
security by capabilities
Topic:
operating system security
Group:
security
Group:
operating system
Group:
program design
Topic:
file cache
Topic:
hard real time systems
Topic:
state machine
Topic:
bootstrapped systems
Topic:
consistency testing
Topic:
dependency analysis
Topic:
reliable communication
Topic:
error safe systems
Topic:
security leaks and weaknesses
Group:
exception handling

Reference

Shapiro, J.S., Hardy, N., "EROS: a principle-driven operating system from the ground up", IEEE Software, January/February 2002, pp. 26-33. Google

Quotations
26 ;;Quote: EROS uses capabilities to run active systems of user code; allows broken or hostile code
26 ;;Quote: EROS has formal verification of security properties and very little performance loss
27 ;;Quote: all operating system resources must be accounted for
27 ;;Quote: workload must not effect correct operations
27 ;;Quote: the EROS kernel cannot create or destroy resources; uses main memory as a cache
27 ;;Quote: all kernel operations are atomic; either complete within a deadline or no observable effect
27 ;;Quote: the EROS kernel does not maintain state; user-allocated storage stores the security and execution state; may be cached
27 ;;Quote: explicitly designate the source of any authority
27 ;;Quote: a secure system must start in a consistent and secure state; EROS periodically verifies a consistent, global checkpoint of the entire state of the machine; used for bootstrapping
28 ;;Quote: EROS uses kernel-protected capabilities; Amoeba treats capabilities as data and can not distinguish them from data
28 ;;Quote: the EROS kernel caches all state; requires explicit allocation of the memory map and dependency tracking
29 ;;Quote: EROS is a large space of capability-protected objects; memory pages, capability nodes, CPU time, network connections; only way to invoke operations
29 ;;Quote: trace every operation to an authorizing capability; every procedure call identifies capabilities; applications require a schedule capability
29 ;;Quote: EROS allows transmission of capabilities across authorized communication paths; this does not limit security
30 ;;Quote: EROS truncates messages to undefined destinations; otherwise, fault handlers may lead to denial-of-service, buffering creates local state, and timeouts are not repeatable under load
32 ;;Quote: EROS is 3x faster than Linux fork/exec and 1000x faster than Linux page faults and memory management
33 ;;Quote: principle-driven design allows effective checks for errors; in eight years, every EROS kernel bug was caught by an assertion check


Related Topics up

ThesaHelp: references sa-sz (237 items)
Topic: open systems (32 items)
Topic: operating system kernel (67 items)
Topic: security by capabilities (65 items)
Topic: operating system security (17 items)
Group: security   (23 topics, 802 quotes)
Group: operating system   (27 topics, 877 quotes)
Group: program design   (13 topics, 453 quotes)
Topic: file cache (23 items)
Topic: hard real time systems (64 items)
Topic: state machine (67 items)
Topic: bootstrapped systems (7 items)
Topic: consistency testing (60 items)
Topic: dependency analysis (31 items)
Topic: reliable communication (29 items)
Topic: error safe systems (75 items)
Topic: security leaks and weaknesses (56 items)
Group: exception handling   (12 topics, 305 quotes)

Collected barberCB 11/02
Copyright © 2002-2008 by C. Bradford Barber. All rights reserved.
Thesa is a trademark of C. Bradford Barber.