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QuoteRef: quinWV_1956
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references p-r
Topic:
beliefs and propositional attitudes
Topic:
fundamental concepts such as type, attributes, relationships are all the same
Topic:
objects as a set of attributes
Topic:
meaning without reference
Topic:
names as abbreviations for descriptions
Reference
Quine, W.V., "Quantifiers and propositional attitudes", The Journal of Philosophy, 53, pp. 177-187, 1956. Google
Other Reference
p. 353-359 in Martinich, A.P. (ed), The Philosophy of Language, 2nd edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
354 ;;Quote: "Ralph believes that someone is a spy" could be either "There is someone whom Ralph believes is a spy" or "Ralph believes there are spies"
354 ;;Quote: consider a man whom Ralph believes is a spy; unknown to Ralph, he is the same person (Ortcutt) that Ralph believes is not a spy; does Ralph believe Ortcutt is a spy?
354 ;;Quote: "There is someone whom Raliph believes is a spy" is a triadic relation between Ralph, spyhood, and the someone
354+;;Quote: propositions are "that"-clauses without free variables; e.g., "Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy"
354+;;Quote: attributes are intensions of a single free variable; e.g., spyhood is z(z is a spy)
355 ;;Quote: can not quantify into propositional-attitudes ("believes that ..."); can quantify into a triadic belief construct, e.g., about spyhood
356 ;;Quote: since belief contexts are referentially opaque, how does one quantify into them; e.g., "There is someone whom Ralph believes is a spy?"
357 ;;Quote: can not drop intensions (attributes) from propositional attitudes; otherwise "w is hunting unicorns" and "w is hunting griffins" are the same
ThesaHelp: references p-r (245 items)
Topic: beliefs and propositional attitudes (28 items)
Topic: fundamental concepts such as type, attributes, relationships are all the same (37 items)
Topic: objects as a set of attributes (39 items)
Topic: meaning without reference (31 items)
Topic: names as abbreviations for descriptions (35 items)