Group:
natural language
Topic:
beliefs and propositional attitudes
Topic:
computer as an intelligent agent
Topic:
consciousness
Topic:
intelligent machines
Topic:
limitations of artificial intelligence and cognitive science
Topic:
meaning by social context
Topic:
philosophy of mind
Topic:
private language argument for skepticism about meaning
Topic:
sense perception
Topic:
vitalism, the soul
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Summary
The problem of other minds is how can we ascribe consciousness to others when we have no experience of that consciousness. The traditional argument is by analogy to our own consciousness. But the scope of the evidence is limited being based on one case, the conclusion is not verifiable, and one must learn the validity of one's own consciousness first [Shorter, Other Minds, Encyl. Phil.]
This is a rich problem at the heart of consciousness. First one needs to identify one's own consciousness as something that a mind has. And second to distinguish one's own mind from others. And third to connect our experience of consciousness with that of others. As Wittgenstein so aptly puts it, "My attitude toward him is an attitude toward a soul." This connection is crucial because it means that concern and the attribution of consciousness are reciprocated.
Searle attempts a more rational explanation. He depends on a causal understanding of behavior to distinguish conscious behavior from mechanical behavior. But isn't such a causal understanding really just a fancy way of saying that our experiences are connected? (cbb 4/94)
Subtopic: knowing other minds 
| Quote: instead of asking what a 'self' is, ask what role does ascriptions of mental states to others play in our lives
| | Quote: to distinguish someone else's pain from my own, need to determine what is it for a body to 'have' a mind that has sensations [»kripSA_1982]
| | Quote: to imagine someone else's pain, have to imagine pain which is not felt (in another's body) on the model of pain which is felt [»wittL_1958a]
| | Quote: my attitude towards a person in pain is an attitude toward a soul; we rush to his aid, we attempt to comfort him; not like a mechanism [»kripSA_1982]
| | Quote: one can image that people are automata, but just try to keep hold of this idea in the midst of your ordinary intercourse with others [»wittL_1958a]
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Subtopic: understanding language
| Quote: to understand another's speech must understand his words and his thoughts [»vyotLS_1962]
| | Quote: if Locke's argument for private language is true then cannot use language for communication [»martAP_1990]
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Subtopic: sensations
| Quote: attempting to connect sensations and physical objects without 'mind' or 'self' leads to dislocated sensations
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Subtopic: animal minds
| Quote: we know animals are conscious because of behavior and a causal understanding of how the world works; solves the problem of other minds [»searJR_1992]
| | Quote: a porpoise can get the idea, as shown by her excitement before performing new tricks [»branS_1974]
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Subtopic: machine "minds"
Quote: Microsoft Office Assistant has a social dimension that encourages an adverse reaction
[»schaH1_2001]
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Related Topics
Group: natural language (16 topics, 539 quotes)
Topic: beliefs and propositional attitudes (28 items)
Topic: computer as an intelligent agent (49 items)
Topic: consciousness (58 items)
Topic: intelligent machines (28 items)
Topic: limitations of artificial intelligence and cognitive science (64 items)
Topic: meaning by social context (33 items)
Topic: philosophy of mind (78 items)
Topic: private language argument for skepticism about meaning (34 items)
Topic: sense perception (55 items)
Topic: vitalism, the soul
(73 items)
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