xiii ;;Quote: consciousness and intentionality are intrinsic and ineliminable, while computation is observer relative; contrary to the dominate position

1 ;;Quote: biological naturalism about mental phenomena-- caused by neurophysiological processes as part of our biological natural history

9 ;;Quote: the defenders of strong AI and functionalism believe that the materialist tradition and science affirms their position

14 ;;Quote: consciousness is an emergent property of the brain just like solidarity or liquidity of water; both mental and physical

16 ;;Quote: we believe that reality is objective but this clearly does not apply to our own subjective states

18 ;;Quote: to study the mind, you must study consciousness; they are the same notion

20 ;;Quote: the ontology of the mental is a first-person ontology, i.e., subjective

21 ;;Quote: we know animals are conscious because of behavior and a causal understanding of how the world works; solves the problem of other minds

21+;;Quote: if same-behavior-ergo-same-mental-phenomena than radios would be conscious; the Turing test is similarly mistaken

32 ;;Quote: we think organization is the answer to intelligence from unintelligent components; but intelligence has third-person criteria that makes the question incoherent

35 ;;Quote: can not identify mental states with brain states without leaving out the mental; both are rigid designators

35+;;Quote: everything is what is and not another thing

40 ;;Quote: for shared beliefs, what is the property shared by different neurophysiological squiggles?; problem with token identity theories

60 ;;Quote: cocktail parties are real but they do not undergo a smooth reduction to physics

90 ;;Quote: consciousness is a biological feature of human and certain animal brains; it is caused by neurobiological processes

105 ;;Quote: consciousness is a feature of the brain like liquidity is a feature of water; it is not "stuff"

107 ;;Quote: conscious organisms have a selectional advantage because of their better discrimination powers

107+;;Quote: conscious organisms represent the world and with intentional actions use their representations to change the world

113 ;;Quote: ontological reduction shows that objects of a certain type are nothing but objects of other types; target for science

114 ;;Quote: causal reduction shows that the existence and causal powers of objects of a certain type are due to the causal powers of objects of another type

114+;;Quote: in the history of science, causal reductions lead to ontological reductions; e.g., reduction of heat to molecular motion redefines heat

116 ;;Quote: consciousness has a causal reduction but not an ontological reduction because it is inherently subjective and first-person

119 ;;Quote: when turn causal into ontological reduction, redefine notions to exclude subjective appearances; e.g., heat from feeling hot to molecular motions

119+;;Quote: the subjective experience of heat still exists after heat is redefined as molecular motion

120 ;;Quote: it is rational to redefine notions like heat to their causes; better control of reality, and fits nature at its causal joints

120+;;Quote: concepts should fit nature at its causal joints

120+;;Quote: Berkely refused to accept the redefinition of subjective concepts to objective ones

122 ;;Quote: consciousness can not be reduced to neurophysiology because its reality is subjective appearances

126 ;;Quote: all furniture is the same shape when wrapped up in enough paper

127 ;;Quote: consciousness is temporally extended but it is not experienced as spatial

130 ;;Quote: consciousness is mostly intentional and intentional states are at least potentially conscious

130+;;Quote: the consciously known features of an object are precisely the conditions of satisfaction for my conscious experiences of them

133 ;;Quote: perception is organized into objects and features, not undifferentiated shapes; consciousness is of something as such and such

135 ;;Quote: familiarity is the source of much of the organization and order of conscious experience; even for an elephant in your room

137 ;;Quote: conscious states "overflow" beyond their immediate content; e.g., can discuss a scene indefinitely

137 ;;Quote: we are consciousness of many things without them being the center of attention; they are not unconscious, e.g., hammering by a skilled carpenter

140 ;;Quote: our current mood pervades all of our conscious forms of intentionality even though it is not itself intentional

152 ;;Quote: an unconscious mental state is always accessible to consciousness; e.g., the belief that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris

179 ;;Quote: each sentence is interpreted against a Background of human capacities; e.g., a waiter won't spread your steak over your head

187 ;;Quote: memory is a mechanism for generating current performance based on past experience, not an inventory of mental states

200 ;;Quote: the operations of the brain can be digitally simulated just like the behavior of the stock market; due to Church's thesis

209 ;;Quote: computation and syntax are observer-relative; 0/1 depends on an interpretation

209+;;Quote: being a chair or a nice day for a picnic is an observer-relative feature

209+;;Quote: mass, gravitational attraction and molecule are intrinsic features of the world; the realm of natural science

209+;;Quote: cognitive science can never be a natural science since computation is observer-relative

212 ;;Quote: most computational theories of mind assume a homunculus; even if reduce to 0/1's still need a homunculus to interpret them

216 ;;Quote: a mechanical computer does not literally follow rules; it only behaves as if it does

218 ;;Quote: word processors are good simulations of a typewriter, but they tell nothing about how typewriters work

229 ;;Quote: the postulation of inaccessible mental phenomena is pre-Darwinian anthropomorphizing; e.g., mental models and universal grammars

241 ;;Quote: cognitive science and universal grammars treat the existence of patterns as evidence for mental representations and unconscious rules; unfounded