Group:
distributed systems
Topic:
authentication
Topic:
communication protocols
Topic:
digital signature
Topic:
implementing distributed systems and applications
Topic:
key distribution
Topic:
operating system security
Topic:
reliability of distributed systems
Topic:
security by secure domains
Topic:
security leaks and weaknesses
Topic:
security of remotely executed code
Topic:
trust
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Subtopic: security protocol 
| Quote: A says S means that principal A supports the statement S; A speaks for B (A=>B) means that if A makes a statement, so does B [»wobbE2_1994]
| | Quote: only a channel can directly make a statement, C says S; e.g., K says S if K signs a certificate containing S [»wobbE2_1994]
|
Subtopic: distributed system security
| Quote: access control lists do not work well for distributed systems; need authentication, delegation, extensibility, and customized policies [»blazM_1999]
| | Quote: in a distributed system can not separate authentication from authorization; huge sets of people and requests, often from strangers [»blazM_1999]
| | Quote: is the key that signed this request authorized to take this action? [»blazM_1999]
| | Quote: does this set of credentials prove that a request complies with the local security policy?
|
Subtopic: self-organized vs. authority
| Quote: use fully self-organized, pairwise key management for mobile ad hoc networks (MANET); authority-based approaches do not work well, e.g., problems with certificate renewal and revocation [»vandJ4_2007]
|
Subtopic: shared system security
| Quote: shared systems serving simultaneous functions with differing security properties; makes computers meeting places [»kampPH7_2004]
| | Quote: types of shared systems -- control-free, Unix processes, Unix access control, full virtual machine models, execution environments, and trusted operating systems [»kampPH7_2004]
|
Subtopic: physical security
| Quote: physically separate untrusted computing resources and the security processors [»rushJ7_1983]
| | Quote: Arpanet needed secure, trusted gateways in locked rooms [»giffDK7_1985, OK]
| | Quote: security in Andrew depends on physically secure servers, trusted superusers, and trusted software; no user software allowed [»satyM8_1989]
|
Subtopic: remote boot protocol
| Quote: with a remote boot protocol can have high confidence in the integrity of a system despite a hostile environment and network [»lomaM1_1995]
|
Subtopic: anonymous domains, e.g., a workgroup
| Quote: avoid using a single entry in a protection domain to stand for a group of users; limited accountability [»satyM8_1989]
|
Subtopic: owned domains
| Quote: an Andrew protection domain is a user or a group of users with an owner; owner prefixed to group name [»satyM8_1989]
|
Subtopic: security levels
| Quote: a connection in Andrew has 4 security levels; HeadersOnly prevents new requests but not release and modify; AuthOnly for secure channels [»satyM8_1989]
|
Subtopic: resource denial
Quote: Andrew does not guarantee resource denial; e.g., flooding network with packets has no clear solution
|
Related Topics
Group: distributed systems (14 topics, 348 quotes)
Topic: authentication (93 items)
Topic: communication protocols (62 items)
Topic: digital signature (25 items)
Topic: implementing distributed systems and applications (41 items)
Topic: key distribution (35 items)
Topic: operating system security (18 items)
Topic: reliability of distributed systems (35 items)
Topic: security by secure domains (45 items)
Topic: security leaks and weaknesses (67 items)
Topic: security of remotely executed code (24 items)
Topic: trust
(21 items)
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