15 ;;Quote: consciousness is amazing; it is the central fact of human existence; without it, the universe is meaningless

16 ;;Quote: intentionality is amazing, i.e., that mental states refer to the world; how can atoms in the void refer?

16 ;;Quote: how can subjective mental phenomena accord with an objective, scientific reality?

17 ;;Quote: mental phenomena appear to cause physical results; if not, then the mind doesn't matter, like froth on a wave

17 ;;Quote: the mind-body problem is difficult because of consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity, and mental causation; can not deny these

19 ;;Quote: everything that matters to our mental life is caused by the nervous system; no mental events from outside events that do not effect the brain

19 ;;Quote: the relationship between mind and brain is like liquidity and water; mind is a feature of brains and it is caused by them

31 ;;Quote: computer programs are syntactical, only minds have semantics and meanings; e.g., Chinese room

35 ;;Quote: if you could build a machine, a physical system, just like a human, it would think

37 ;;Quote: a weather simulation is certainly not weather; why do we think that a computer simulation of the mind could think?

39 ;;Quote: a computer program can not give a system a mind

46 ;;Quote: to follow a rule, the meaning of the rule must have a causal role; behavior itself is insufficient (many possible rules)

47 ;;Quote: computers don't follow rules, they only act as if they did

47+;;Quote: human beings often don't follow rules

52 ;;Quote: we effortlessly recognize faces; perhaps it is like making a footprint in sand (hard to simulate)

57 ;;Quote: the same bodily movements could be a dance, signaling, or exercise; and one type of action could be done by many different movements

58 ;;Quote: human actions have preferred descriptions; what someone does is what they think they are doing; e.g., walking to Hyde Park

58 ;;Quote: people generally know what they are doing and can explain the behavior of others, perhaps through mastery of a set of principles

62 ;;Quote: human action has a mental, intentional component and a physical component; it is explained by intentional causation

63 ;;Quote: can experimentally separate the mental component of action from the physical component; e.g., by stimulating the motor cortex

65 ;;Quote: intentional, human actions are either premeditated or they are spontaneous, e.g., normal conversation

65 ;;Quote: practical reasoning is about choosing between conflicting desires; beliefs are about how to satisfy our desires

66 ;;Quote: the preferred description of intentional action is determined by the intentions that caused it; not like other, natural events

67 ;;Quote: intentional states only function as part of a network of intentions that determines the conditions of satisfaction

68 ;;Quote: the network of intentionality functions against a background of human capacities that are not themselves mental states; e.g., driving

78 ;;Quote: many social and psychological phenomena exist because we think they do; e.g., marriage, money, trade unions; unlike biology or physics

78 ;;Quote: strict laws of social sciences are impossible because social phenomena have no physical limits on possible realizations; e.g., money, war

80 ;;Quote: mental events are not particular, neuro-physiological processes because an event, e.g., money, has too much physical variability

96 ;;Quote: the experience of freedom of choice is an intrinsic part of intentional action; can not be given up

98 ;;Quote: in general, our commonsense, mentalistic conception of ourselves is consistent with nature as a physical system

98+;;Quote: radical freedom of will is impossible under a scientific world view

98+;;Quote: we cannot discover that we do not have minds with conscious, subjective mental states, nor that we do not at least try to engage in voluntary action