Group:
naming
Topic:
beliefs and propositional attitudes
Topic:
denoting phrases and definite descriptions
Topic:
entities
Topic:
information hiding
Topic:
is a name a literal string or a symbol
Topic:
meaning by social context
Topic:
meaning by use
Topic:
meaning of words
Topic:
meaning without reference
Topic:
names as abbreviations for descriptions
Topic:
names defined by context
Topic:
names independent of objects
Topic:
naming by pointing or recognition
Topic:
objects without names
Topic:
proper names
Topic:
referential transparency
Topic:
sentences, propositions, and truth
Topic:
set definition by extension or intension
Group:
sets
Topic:
symbolic representation
Topic:
using an address as a name
Topic:
using a description as a name
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Summary
An important distinction is that between Frege's sense and reference or Mill's connotation and denotation. Ziff puts it very nicely: 'This' and 'That' can denote the same cat yet with clearly different meanings. Frege notes that 'a=b' is vacuous without a difference in meaning. Wittgenstein argues that a death doesn't change the meaning of the name, and that two words can mean the same thing in different ways. Quine applies the argument to '9 is the number of planets'; these clearly have different meanings, but they both refer to '9'.
But what's important to meaning is reference. It is only via reference that a sentence is true or false, and only by extensions that we can substitute without changing meaning. There may be many ways to say or do something, but in the end what matters is what is said or done. As Quine puts it reference is disquotational.
On the other side is the amazing fact of intentionality that gives meaning in the first place. Is it a background sensibility, or something ingrained in the world. Isn't sense that comes first, that makes it possible to have a reference at all? And what about coloration and the other aspects of meaning? (cbb 4/94)
Subtopic: signs/names more than reference 
| Quote: names mean more than reference in identity statements, existential statements, and statements about intentional states [»searJR_1983]
| | Quote: a difference in sign corresponds to a difference in how the designated objects are given
| | Quote: say "X" and "Y" for negation but "XX" meant yes (turn 180 degrees) while "YY" meant no (shake head); same reference, different ideas [»wittL_1958a]
| | Quote: if someone says "Bring me a slab" it could mean the same as "Slab!"; its meaning is sometimes 1 word and sometimes 4 [»wittL_1958a]
| | Quote: 9 and 'the number of planets' name the same abstract entity but differ in meaning; requires astronomical observation to equate [»quinWV1_1951]
| | Quote: terms can name the same thing but differ in meaning; e.g., FregeG's evening star and RussellB's author of Waverly
| | Quote: 'this' and 'that' have different meanings but the same set of referents; hence meaning and reference are not the same [»ziffP_1960]
| | Quote: meaning is not the same as reference; e.g., when Mr. N. dies the person dies but not the meaning of Mr. N. [»wittL_1958a]
|
Subtopic: meaning is compositional
| Quote: understand X+Y by recursively understanding each part independently; manifest structure, clear meaning and purpose
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Subtopic: referentially opaque and quantifiers
| Quote: 'Necessarily' and 'Possibly' are referentially opaque; depends on wording; e.g., "number of planets = 9" and "9 is necessarily greater than 7" [»quinWV_1947]
| | Quote: existential generalization does not apply to irreferential terms; e.g., can not infer that (.thereExists.x)(there is no such thing as x) [»quinWV_1947]
| | Quote: can not apply quantifiers to a referentially opaque context; e.g., (.thereExists.x)('six' contains 'x') [»quinWV_1947]
|
Subtopic: a=a vs. a=b
| Quote: an identity statement may be true (same meaning) and yet informative (different criterion for identity)
| | Quote: if reference were the sole meaning of signs, then a=a and a=b would mean the same whenever a=b was true [»fregG_1892]
| | Note: Frege's puzzle--if reference exhausts the semantic content of an expression then a=a and a=b are the same [»fregG_1892, OK]
| | Quote: if the meaning of a sentence is its reference than the same reference implies synonymy; this is intolerable
| | Quote: puzzles of denoting: a=b vs. a=a, 'the present King of France is/is not bald', if A differs from B is false [»russB_1956]
|
Subtopic: intentionality
| Quote: intentionality is amazing, i.e., that mental states refer to the world; how can atoms in the void refer? [»searJR_1984]
|
Subtopic: attributes vs. reference -- intension vs. extension
| Quote: each symbol has two kinds of meaning: sense (connotation, intension) and denotation (reference, extension) [»kimuTD7_1985]
| | Quote: the initial identification of an object is by description; so a name can't have a reference without a sense [»searJR_1958]
| | Quote: a concrete name (e.g., man) directly denotes subjects, and indirectly connotes the defining attributes [»millJS_1843, OK]
| | Quote: a connotative term (e.g., white) denotes a subject and connotes an attribute (e.g., whiteness) [»millJS_1843, OK]
| | Quote: the intension or meaning of a term is different than its extension
| | Quote: the intension of a word is meaning in semantic memory while its extension is the corresponding set of things [»sowaJF_1984]
| | Quote: in an extensional language can interchange equivalent extensional predicates but the agreement may be accidental and not due to meaning
| | Quote: even though two expressions denote the same person they can have different senses because of different descriptions [»kimuTD7_1985]
| | Quote: the intension of a word is meaning in semantic memory while its extension is the corresponding set of things [»sowaJF_1984]
| | Quote: sets of conditions are correlated with the elements of E that have meaning in English; such state regularities are simply a fact [»ziffP_1960]
|
Subtopic: sense vs. reference
| Quote: can define a circle by drawing a circle or by drawing tangents, i.e., by pointing or description [»ziffP_1960]
| | Quote: a sign designates an object (its reference) and expresses a manner and context of presentation (its sense or meaning) [»fregG_1892]
| | Quote: meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word [»quinWV1_1951]
| | Quote: sense is a name for our background familiarity that makes intelligibility possible; replaces being as ultimate ground [»dreyHL_1991]
| | Quote: proper names isolate the referring function from the describing function of language
|
Subtopic: meaning is sense
| Quote: sense is what determines the truth-value of a sentence while coloring is everything else; e.g., chap vs. guy or man [»dummM_1967]
| | Quote: if the truth-value of a sentence changes when the name of an object changes, it is talking about the sense of those names and not the object itself
| | Note: sense determines reference [»fregG_1892, OK]
| | Quote: a general thing abstracts from an actual distribution; so the meaning of general things determines reference [»stawPF_1954]
| | Quote: meaning vs. reference is wrongly conceived because can't speak about the meaning of a denoting phrase; 'the meaning of "C"' == 'C' [»russB_1956]
| | Note: reference is disquotational, i.e., forAll x (the word 'x' refers to x); separates reference from individualistic senses of meaning [»fregG_1892, OK]
|
Subtopic: meaning is reference
| Quote: the meaning of a name is its bearer; the significance is what is known when an expression is understood (including its sense) [»dummM_1967]
| | Quote: the sense of a name includes the criterion of identity for the referenced object [»dummM_1967]
| | Quote: understanding: there are many ways to say or do something, but all are the same [»browGS_1972]
| | Quote: if meaning is distinct from reference than the parts of a sentence must also have a distinct meaning; yields vacuous answers [»daviD_1967]
| | Quote: truth is a special case of reference, and reference (not sense) is what matters to truth
| | Note: X and Y have the same sense when X and Y necessarily have the same reference in all possible situations [»fregG_1892, OK]
|
Subtopic: meaning more than sense and reference
| Quote: symbols have multiple, complex meanings and denotations, often varying from one context to another [»kentW6_1991]
| | Note: sense and reference do not exhaust meaning; e.g., 'dog' and 'cur' have same sense but different colorations [»fregG_1892, OK]
| | Quote: use sound instead of sense to avoid oddity in '... and ... are one and the same cat.'; e.g., 'Witchgren' and 'Grenwitch' [»ziffP_1960]
| QuoteRef: bateG_1972 ;;34 Macbeth III.l "Ay--in the catalogue ye go for men. as hounds and greyhounds, mongrels, spaniels, curs, shoughs, water-rugs and demi-wolves are clept all by the name of dogs"
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Related Topics
Group: naming (32 topics, 789 quotes)
Topic: beliefs and propositional attitudes (28 items)
Topic: denoting phrases and definite descriptions (21 items)
Topic: entities (20 items)
Topic: information hiding (50 items)
Topic: is a name a literal string or a symbol (23 items)
Topic: meaning by social context (33 items)
Topic: meaning by use (58 items)
Topic: meaning of words (21 items)
Topic: meaning without reference (31 items)
Topic: names as abbreviations for descriptions (35 items)
Topic: names defined by context (36 items)
Topic: names independent of objects (34 items)
Topic: naming by pointing or recognition (13 items)
Topic: objects without names (7 items)
Topic: proper names (35 items)
Topic: referential transparency (26 items)
Topic: sentences, propositions, and truth (23 items)
Topic: set definition by extension or intension (18 items)
Group: sets (7 topics, 148 quotes)
Topic: symbolic representation (26 items)
Topic: using an address as a name (22 items)
Topic: using a description as a name
(21 items)
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