Higg. ;;Note: shared senses can be contradictory but private senses don't agree and chain of references can be broken; is a name simply an abbreviation?

273 ;;Quote: analytic statements are true by virtue of linguistic rules alone, without recourse to empirical investigation

273 ;;Quote: that a mark refers to the same object on two occasions is a convenient but contingent usage; e.g., a language in which "x=y" is analytic

Higg. ;;Note: "Cicero = Tully" informs people about a language; e.g., merge if names are clusters of characteristics

274 ;;Quote: the initial identification of an object is by description; so a name can't have a reference without a sense

275 ;;Quote: for proper names, sense is necessary but reference is contingent; they look like shorthand or a vague description

275+;;Quote: we say Zeus never existed to mean that certain kinds (descriptions) of objects never existed with that name

275 ;;Quote: a proper name refers without presupposing a context; demonstratives and singular, referring expressions assume a context

276 ;;Quote: a proper name presupposes the truth of unspecified, uniquely referring descriptive statements

276+;;Quote: sense supplies the means by which a name is recognized as the thing referred to

276 ;;Quote: proper names refer publicly to objects without having to agree on what description identifies an object

276+;;Quote: proper names are pegs on which to hang descriptions

276+;;Quote: proper names isolate the referring function from the describing function of language

277 ;;Quote: it is necessary that Aristotle has at least some of the properties ascribed to him

277 ;;Quote: proper names are logically connected with descriptions but they are not used to describe; so proper names sort of have a sense