330 ;;Quote: proper names exist because we need to make repeated references to the same object, even if not present

330 ;;Quote: to name or verify a name, must have some other representation of the object

331 ;;Quote: recognizing an object may be a speaker's only "identifying description"

332 ;;Quote: Kripke's casual theory of names only reaches to the baptism of an object, but not the object itself

332+;;Quote: in the casual theory of names, reference is fixed by intentional content

332 ;;Quote: in Kripke's casual theory of names, each speaker must intend to refer to the same object as the person who taught the name

333 ;;Quote: Madagascar originally referred to the mainland until Marco Polo accidentally used it for an island; the casual chain is not sufficient

334 ;;Quote: can use a proper name even though no causal connection to an object; e.g., M Street in Washington or the names of numbers

334 ;;Quote: the causal theory of names is incorrect; e.g., a tribe where every name is known by ostension and hence description

336 ;;Quote: how does a proper name refer to an object?

336+;;Quote: Mill's account of proper names as non-connotative simply says that they do refer, and that's that

336 ;;Quote: could talk about 'Plotinus' even though only heard his name mentioned; but the reference is parasitic on other speakers

337 ;;Quote: the causal chain of communication for naming is simply an external view of names that are known via others

337+;;Quote: names as description is primary over the causal theory because only the former guarantees a fixed reference

338 ;;Quote: does a name refer because an object fits a description or because of facts that are independent of description

339 ;;Quote: the causal theory of names sets no constraints on the reference; e.g., 'Aristotle' might refer to a bar stool if that's where the chain lead to

341 ;;Quote: suppose someone only knows that Thales was a Greek philosopher but Aristotle actually used 'Thales' for a well digger; 'Thales' still wouldn't be the well digger

342 ;;Quote: the sense of a proper name is the definite description associated with the name

344 ;;Quote: any definite description can be a rigid designator by indexing it to the actual world

344 ;;Quote: names mean more than reference in identity statements, existential statements, and statements about intentional states

344+;;Quote: names refer to the same object in different possible worlds; the object can have different properties

344 ;;Quote: reference occurs only if the object satisfies a set of conditions associated with the referring device; i.e., its intentional content; includes recognition

345 ;;Quote: a name can be used as a rigid designator because the identity of an object is separable from its description; e.g., Homer need not have written the Odyssey

345 ;;Quote: the most important names are for frequent, personal contacts; though learned from other people, a reference does not depend on others

345+;;Quote: a frequently used name is associated with a rich collection of intentional contents in the Network

345 ;;Quote: proper names can have prominent uses not based on acquaintance; constrained regardless of chain of communication, e.g., 'Japan' could not refer to a butterfly