Higg. ;;Note: can teach the concept of analytical truth just as one can describe a 'dog' even though can't give a rigorous definition

Higg.+;;Note: analytical truths such a 'p or not-p' is known by the rules of language; not via behavior

20 ;;Quote: the dogmas of empiricism are ill-founded (i.e., analytic vs. synthetic and reductionism)

20 ;;Quote: Kant's analytic truths and Leibniz's truths of reason are those that can not be false

21 ;;Quote: 9 and 'the number of planets' name the same abstract entity but differ in meaning; requires astronomical observation to equate

21+;;Quote: terms can name the same thing but differ in meaning; e.g., FregeG's evening star and RussellB's author of Waverly

21 ;;Quote: meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word

21+;;Quote: the extension of a term is those entities for which the term is true

21+;;Quote: the intension or meaning of a term is different than its extension

22 ;;Quote: theory of meaning for recognizing synonymy of linguistic forms and analyticity of statements

22+;;Quote: 'p or not p' is logically true while 'no bachelor is married' is true by the nature of language; both analytical

26 ;;Quote: combine primitive and concise notations by rules of translation which define primitive equivalents for concise terms

26+;;Quote: in logical and mathematical systems want both concise notations and primitive notations that are economical in vocabulary and grammar

27 ;;Quote: a definition may faithfully paraphrase a term in a narrower notation, or explicate a term, or create a new notation

27+;;Quote: definitions add brevity and convenience to an otherwise universal, primitive notation

27 ;;Quote: except when defining new terms, definition hinges on prior relations of synonymy

30 ;;Quote: if a language contains intension adverbs (necessarily) then interchanging equivalent predicates can demonstrate cognitive synonymy; analytic already

30+;;Quote: in an extensional language can interchange equivalent extensional predicates but the agreement may be accidental and not due to meaning

33 ;;Quote: an artificial language could specify its analytic statements but this assumes a notion of analytic already

36 ;;Quote: truth depends on both language and extralinguistic fact; but can not distinguish analytic statements as not based on fact; act of faith

37 ;;Quote: by verification theory, synonymous statements are alike in method of empirical confirmation or infirmation

37+;;Quote: by verification theory, an analytic statement is confirmed no matter what

38 ;;Quote: radical reductionism: every meaningful statement is translatable into a predicate about immediate experience

38+;;Quote: Carnap in Aufau used mathematics and a parsimonious experiential language to define important additional sensory concepts

39 ;;Quote: Frege's reorientation from terms to significant statements underlies the verification theory of meaning; statements are verified

40 ;;Quote: Carnap proposed a principle of least action in assigning qualities to point-instants so that they match our experiences

40+;;Quote: Carnap was not able to connect 'quality at location x;y;z;t' with his language of sense data and logic

41 ;;Quote: the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science and not statements (Frege) or terms (Locke)

41+;;Quote: it is nonsense to distinguish between a linguistic and a factual component to the truth of any one statement

42 ;;Quote: our knowledge is a man-made fabric that matches experience only along the edges

42+;;Quote: if our knowledge contradicts experience, many workable modifications; any one statement can remain true

44 ;;Quote: the gods of Homer and physical objects are both irreducible posits of a system of knowledge; instrumentalism

44+;;Quote: as an empiricist, science is a tool for predicting future experience via past experience

45;;Quote: the edge of a system must match experience; for the rest, the objective is simplicity of its laws