Map
Index
Random
Help
th

Quote: the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science and not statements (Frege) or terms (Locke)

topics > all references > references p-r > QuoteRef: quinWV1_1951 , p. 41



Topic:
problems with empirical truth
Topic:
meaning by language as a whole
Topic:
problems with analytic truth

Quotation Skeleton

My counter suggestion, issuing essentially from Carnap's doctrine … the tribunal of sense experience not individually but … [also argued by P. Duhem, La Theories physique: son objet et sa structure (Paris: 1906, p. 303-328) and Lowinger, A., The Methodology of Pierre Duhem, Columbia University Press 1941, p. 132-40)]. … [p. 41] The two dogmas [of analyticity and verification] are, indeed, at … confirmatory experiences. In the extreme case where the … now impressed with how stubbornly the distinction between … [p. 42] My present suggestion is that it is … component in the truth of any individual statement. … The idea of defining a symbol in use … rather than the term, came with Frege to … is that even in taking the statement as … of science.   Google-1   Google-2

Copyright clearance needed for quotation.

Additional Titles

Quote: it is nonsense to distinguish between a linguistic and a factual component to the truth of any one statement

Related Topics up

Topic: problems with empirical truth (21 items)
Topic: meaning by language as a whole (26 items)
Topic: problems with analytic truth (20 items)

Copyright © 2002-2008 by C. Bradford Barber. All rights reserved.
Thesa is a trademark of C. Bradford Barber.