7 ;;Quote: human practices are a hopeless tangle, yet it forms the background that determines our judgment and concepts; must accept as is
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7 ;;Quote: the commonsense background has an elaborate structure; requires an existential analytic and a special vocabulary; Heidegger vs. Wittgenstein
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37 ;;Quote: human being is interpretation all the way down; better to recognize the rootlessness than to falsely avoid it; allows openness, tenacity, and gaiety
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37+;;Quote: Heidegger's method is the hermeneutics of suspicion; it violently exposes disguises
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58 ;;Quote: everyday activity does not involve self-referential mental content; being-in-the-world is primary; mental-state intentionality is derivative
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85 ;;Quote: even though we act deliberately, we do this against the familiar background of transparent coping
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156 ;;Quote: Heidegger holds that everyday intelligibility is false; no right interpretation; the ultimate ground is shared practices
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221 ;;Quote: everyday communication can not be understood as context-free messages sent from one isolated mind to another; needs shared background
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221 ;;Quote: sense is a name for our background familiarity that makes intelligibility possible; replaces being as ultimate ground
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282 ;;Quote: the present age levels distinctions between teachers and students, kings and subjects; it empties life of significance
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282+;;Quote: if the present age has leveled qualitative distinctions, how can I be committed to anything?
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284 ;;Quote: self and commitment are synonymous, a synthesis of eternal and temporal; human freedom is the freedom of being self-defining
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284 ;;Quote: Kierkegaard's spheres of existence: aesthetic (enjoyment), ethical (absolutes), religiousness A (self-annihilation) and B (cause)
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294 ;;Quote: religiousness A's absolute relationship to an absolute God results in despair at sustaining the relationship; all is leveled and relative
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297 ;;Quote: the faith of religiousness B risks losing everything by a total commitment; the self relates itself to God by itself alone
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298 ;;Quote: Heidegger allows an authentic way of life without faith by recognizing that meaningful differences are artificial
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299 ;;Quote: Heidegger borrows much from Kierkegaard, e.g., the self defining itself and the present age's anxiety-motivated cover-up
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301 ;;Quote: the shared, public world is the only world there is; the self is a selection of interpretations made available by the culture
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301+;;Quote: subjectivity may exist independently of a public world or it may arise out of dispersion in the public world
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301 ;;Quote: there are no unique projects defining individual worlds; being-there is in terms of the public situation; one presses into possibilities
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301+;;Quote: humans are subjects that make choices only in cases of breakdown
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302 ;;Quote: one lives out of one's culture's version of what is normal and presses into what needs to be done; Kierkegaard is too intentionalistic
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316 ;;Quote: Heidegger's authenticity is a secularized version of Kierkegaard's religiousness A; accept nullity by a gestalt switch
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319 ;;Quote: how can one lead an authentic life when all projects are equally meaningless; can if action arises from the Background and not from choice
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320 ;;Quote: resoluteness: authentic Dasein sees what needs to be done by finding itself pushed into doing it; transformed during 'the glance of an eye'
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325 ;;Quote: authentic Dasein has no absolute, defining commitments; commitments only as long as the Situation demands that commitment
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326 ;;Quote: the self must manifest its basic nothingness in each conditional commitment; an empty, formal, constancy
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326+;;Quote: steadiness and constancy come from an unconditional stand, an absolute commitment to something specific
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334 ;;Quote: why are we the kind of beings that can't face being the kind of beings we are? irresoluteness is like good vs. evil
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