190 ;;Quote: a=a vs. a=b indicates that Sameness is a relation between names of objects; only a=a is a priori

190+;;Quote: the idea of Sameness challenges reflection

190+;;Quote: is Sameness a relation? a relation between objects? or between names of objects?

190 ;;Quote: if identity was between objects, then a=b and a=a would be the same whenever a=b is true

190 ;;Quote: a=b means that the names 'a' and 'b' name the same thing; asserts a relation between names

190 ;;Quote: if reference were the sole meaning of signs, then a=a and a=b would mean the same whenever a=b was true

190+;;Quote: a difference in sign corresponds to a difference in how the designated objects are given

191 ;;Quote: a sign designates an object (its reference) and expresses a manner and context of presentation (its sense or meaning)

191 ;;Quote: a proper name designates a single object; its sense is grasped by any speaker of the language

191 ;;Quote: proper names such as 'Aristotle' may have varying senses; should be avoided in science and perfect languages

191 ;;Quote: an expression may have a sense without a nominatum or reference; e.g., such a thing may be impossible

191 ;;Quote: can speak of the sense of an expression A; so a word's customary sense is its indirect nominatum

192 ;;Quote: the sense of a sign is shared by others; the sense lies in between, not subjective as is the image, but not the object either

194 ;;Quote: a sentence is true or false only if the nominata of its components are true or false; the value is invariant under different senses

194+;;Quote: truth is a special case of reference, and reference (not sense) is what matters to truth

196 ;;Quote: in 'Copernicus believed that ...' the nominata of the clause and its words are indirect and not truth-values; the clause acts as a noun

197 ;;Quote: 'The will of the people' has an ambiguous nominatum; allows demagogic misuse; should prevent such expressions, at least in science

198 ;;Quote: only the whole of a conditional statement contains a proposition that is true or false

201 ;;Quote: can not replace a clause with one of the same truth-value if it expresses only part of a proposition, or it is also part of another proposition

Higg. ;;Note: sense determines reference

Higg. ;;Note: logicism--Frege showed that arithmetic rests on logic; he developed logic and the notion of proof; defined 'generality', e.g., all A are B

Higg. ;;Note: Frege breaks a simple predicate (with a truth value) into proper names and concepts or relations; '___ is white' stands for whiteness

Higg.+;;Note: 'Men are mortal' subordinates the concept 'men' to the concept 'mortal'; not an attribute

Quine ;;Note: reference is disquotational, i.e., forAll x (the word 'x' refers to x); separates reference from individualistic senses of meaning

Higg. ;;Note: X and Y have the same sense when X and Y necessarily have the same reference in all possible situations

Higg. ;;Note: sense and reference do not exhaust meaning; e.g., 'dog' and 'cur' have same sense but different colorations

Kald. ;;Note: Frege's puzzle--if reference exhausts the semantic content of an expression then a=a and a=b are the same

Kald. ;;Note: descriptivism--a singular term is synonymous with a descriptive phrase that fixes its reference; its sense is its descriptive content