25 ;;Quote: a description may not refer to the intended referent; e.g., "the man with champagne is happy"; Kripke ignores this

30 ;;Quote: a descriptive name can not actually be the name, otherwise get tautologies

32 ;;Quote: while a description does not give the meaning of a name, it can fix the reference

35 ;;Quote: a priori knowledge may be know empirically; e.g., a computer says a number is prime

35 ;;Quote: a necessary fact is true in all possible worlds; e.g., if the Goldbach conjecture is true, it is necessarily true

Higg. ;;Note: kinds of truth: a priori (independent of experience), necessary, analytic (by meaning alone), and contingent

48 ;;Quote: a rigid designator designates the same object in all possible worlds; the object need not exist

Higg. ;;Note: scope ambiguity does not occur with names across modal operators such as possibly

48 ;;Quote: names are rigid designators; 'no other than Nixon might have been Nixon'

48 ;;Quote: a rigid designator designates an object if it does so wherever the object exists

52 ;;Quote: a particular is not a bundle of qualities; since quality is abstract, a bundle of qualities is even more so

52 ;;Quote: an object has properties but it should not be identified with its properties or a subset

52 ;;Quote: can identify an object by pointing to it; this holds in other possible worlds

53 ;;Quote: the essential properties of an object do not need to be those properties used to identify it

55 ;;Quote: a name is a rigid designator in all possible worlds, while a description may differ in other worlds

57 ;;Quote: a description is not a rigid designator because properties could change in other possible worlds

57 ;;Quote: a description can fix the reference of a name

58 ;;Quote: Moses might not have done anything ascribed to him, but he still could have existed

64 ;;Quote: a theory of names is inherently wrong

64 ;;Quote: cluster theory of names: if most of the properties match, then the object is identified

79 ;;Quote: consider Neptune before it was ever seen; its description was an a priori truth but not a necessary one

Higg. ;;Note: consider Nextperson as a proper name; its description fixes its reference but does not give its meaning; i.e., contingent, a priori truth

81 ;;Quote: even though the man in the street can't describe Richard Feynman uniquely, he uses the name "Feynman" as a name for Feynman

83 ;;Quote: suppose the author of Godel's theorem was actually Schmidt; even then, references to Godel are to Godel himself

91 ;;Quote: the name of a baby is spread by a chain of using the name in sorts of talk

91 ;;Quote: Feynman is identified by a chain of communication back to Feynman himself; not by a declarative ceremony in private

96 ;;Quote: naming by an initial 'baptism' and then passed from person to person with an intension to keep the reference fixed

102 ;;Quote: different names of the same object rigidly designate that same object

138 ;;Quote: scientific properties are necessary but not a priori, e.g., gold has atomic number 79, but was still gold beforehand

157 ;;Quote: the discovery of animals with unicorn characteristics might be coincidence instead of the unicorns of the myth

Higg. ;;Note: list of modal forms--necessarily, possibly, not; behaves like forAll and thereExists; be careful of secondary occurrences

Higg.+;;Note: de re beliefs hold for a specific object while de dicto beliefs hold for all objects